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This paper documents the changing patterns of corporate interlocking among
approximately 250 corporations across four time periods—1962, 1973, 1983, and
1995. By utilizing network analyses, we describe several attributes of the overall
set of interlocking corporate directors in a period of increasing corporate concen-
tration, economic globalization, and changing regulatory environments. Measures
of network density are based on all corporations and are broken-down by the ties
formed by single versus multiple interlocking directorates. Three measures of net-
work centralization are based on complete sociomatricies in which all ties between
corporations are non-directional and have been recorded as either present or absent.
Finally, we report the number of cliques formed by minimum size across time.
Measures of network density, centralization and the number of cliques all under-
score that the network of corporate ties in 1995 is less dense, less concentrated,
and contain few subgroups. Our analyses at the corporate level demonstrate that
these changes occurred primarily among  nancial corporations and correspond to
a period of dramatic changes in the U.S.  nancial markets. Given our descriptive
 ndings, we conclude that interlocking directorates in the United States are becom-
ing less concentrated, though by no means insigni cant.
Networks of Corporate Interlocking: 1962–19951
In 1913, three years before he was to be appointed to the United
States Supreme Court, Louis D. Brandeis wrote, “The practice of inter-
locking directorates is the root of many evils. . . . Applied to rival cor-
porations, it tends to the suppression of competition and to violation of
the Sherman law. Applied to corporations which deal with each other,
it tends to disloyalty . . .” (quoted in U.S. Senate, 1978:1). As the date
of this quote indicates, the critique of the corporate ties formed by inter-
locking directorates is by no means new. However, the domestic and
international context in which interlocking directorates exist and oper-
ate in the United States is qualitatively diVerent from those existing a
hundred years ago.
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Speci cally, the second half of the Twentieth Century has witnessed
three signi cant changes to the context of capital accumulation. On the
one hand, the United States has witnessed a growing concentration of
capital. In 1962, the 500 largest industrial corporations in terms of rev-
enues accounted for 39.06 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
By 1995, the combined revenues of the 500 largest industrial corpora-
tions represented 63.38 percent of the nation’s GDP.2 On the other
hand, the U.S. economy has experienced unprecedented change in 
its  nancial markets. Davis and Mizruchi (1999) have shown that the
declining network centrality of commercial banks over the past twenty
years corresponds to a period of exceptional change in the bank indus-
try.3 During the 1980s, commercial banks lost their status as the pri-
mary source of lending among industrial corporations. Furthermore,
advances in information technologies dispossessed commercial banks
from their privileged access to information on potential borrowers and
facilitated the internationalization of  nancial markets. Finally, changes
in interstate baking regulations permitted the establishment of powerful
regional banks. Taken together, the concentration of capital and the
changes within  nancial markets present profound implications for the
structure of corporate interlocks for the period of time between 1962
and 1995.
Internationally, the context in which corporate interlocks operate is
one of increasing globalization. By increased globalization, we are adopt-
ing Leslie Sklair’s fourth use of the term that focuses upon “the struc-
tures of an ever-more globalizing capitalism.” (1999:155) This approach
diVers from the World Systems analysis of Wallerstein (1980), or the
development of capitalism logic of Dobb (1967). By globalization, we
wish to emphasize that the operation, reach, and function of today’s
corporation is global and therefore distinguishes a qualitatively diVerent
set of concepts and processes. One indication of the need for such a
reorientation is the increasing power of the world’s largest transnational
corporations. Anderson and Cavanagh (2000:3) report that in 1983, the
combined revenues of the 200 largest corporations in the world accounted
for 25.0 percent of the world GDP. By 1999, the combined revenues
of the 200 largest global corporations had increased to 27.5 percent. Fur-
thermore, as Sklair (1998) notes, many California-based Fortune Global
500 corporations are world-wide in their operations. To begin, corpo-
rations such as Chevron and Rockwell operated in over one hundred
diVerent countries according to their 1995 annual reports. Even within
the electric utility industry—traditionally a national, if not regional indus-
try—Edison International reported that 15 percent of its assets in 1994
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were based outside of the United States. Furthermore, when examining
the percent of revenues and percent of pro ts from foreign investments,
Sklair’s research underscores the extent to which the top corporations
in California have adopted a global orientation. 4 Therefore, whether
due to a world-wide-web of consumerism featuring such brand names
of Coca-Cola, Sony, Disney and McDonald’s (Sklair, 2001:85–9), the
increasing number of multilateral trade agreements such as NAFTA, or
the transformation of global information technologies and capital  ows
(Salisbury and Barnett, 1999), it is clear that corporations are increas-
ingly global in their orientation and operation.
Given these changes in the context of capital accumulation, it is rea-
sonable to investigate the patterns of corporate interlocking over the last
forty years. It has been twenty years since the Insurgent Sociologist pub-
lished its second special issue on Power Structure Research that included
speci c data on interlocking directorates.5 It is time to revitalize empir-
ical research into the structure of corporate interlocking in the United
States. Although our research  ndings are primarily descriptive, the con-
tributions of this paper lay in the longitudinal nature of this study, the
explanation of several network attributes, and the comparison of four
data points between 1962 and 1995—a period of increased corporate
concentration and globalization within the world economy.
Interlocking Directorates in Contemporary Capitalism
While there is a substantial body of literature on interlocking direc-
torates in historical and comparative perspectives,6 it is important that
we isolate and frame our descriptive results within a few key aspects of
the literature. Broadly speaking, the changing patterns of corporate inter-
locking between 1962 and 1995 should indicate or re ect changes in
the development of contemporary capitalism. While this foundational
proposition  nds support among many researchers engaged in this area
of specialization, the terrain of debate upon which scholars interpret the
signi cance of interlocking directorates is multifaceted. One complica-
tion is the fact that research on interlocking directorates often is con-
ducted at three very diVerent levels of analysis and sometimes employs
various units of observation. For instance, Scott’s (1985)  ve models of
interlocking directorates—the  nance capital, the co-ordination and 
control, the resource dependence, the managerial, and the class cohe-
sion—operate at very diVerent levels of analysis. At one end of the
micro-macro spectrum is the research that focuses on the individual di-
rectors themselves and documents their myriad business, family, political
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and social connections. At the other extreme is the work that focuses on
the network of corporate interlocks. Here, interlocking directorates are
most informative when examined as a totality. At the intermediate level
of analysis, research focuses on the links forged between corporations
through interlocking directorates. Important research also transcends
these distinctions by integrating both the individual and organizational
levels of analyses. Joseph Galaskiewicz and colleagues emphasize that
neither corporate attributes such as size or the characteristics of the
speci c directors (i.e., their prestige) predicted the existence of a par-
ticular ties between corporations. Rather, it was an interaction between
individual and organizational factors that proved to be the best pre-
dictors of intercorporate ties. In short, “clout and grace” matter. (Galas-
kiewicz et al., 1985:422)
While we recognize the limitations of imposing a strict demarcation
between the individual, organizational, and structural levels of analyses,
this distinction is useful in organizing key developments in the litera-
ture. At the individual level of analysis, the empirical and theoretical
emphasis of this area of research demonstrates how interlocking direc-
torates contribute to the overall unity of the rich and powerful. Perhaps
most identi ed with C. Wright Mills (1956), G. William DomhoV (1967;
1970; 1983; 1998), and Michael Useem (1984), the class cohesion model
focuses upon the mechanisms that generate a common ideology and
organizational unity. C. Wright Mills considers how the elite 1) develop
a psychological similarity, 2) become structurally situated for regular
social interaction, and 3) articulate and pursue common interests. Dom-
hoV extends this theme by demonstrating how such social aYliations
are parlayed into political power. Consequently, the frequency of inter-
marriage, the coincidence of elite school attendance, and the common
membership in exclusive social clubs are important not solely because
they generate a dominant ideology. Equally important, these social ties
are used to in uence the political process via lobbying, the “revolving
door” between business executives and government oYcials, and the
political in uence of interest organizations such as the Council on For-
eign Relations. Research by Joseph Galaskiewicz also establishes the im-
portance of the personal relationships between the corporate elite and
nonpro t organizations (1985). Finally, Useem develops the concept of
“business scan” to argue that corporate ties need not re ect resource
dependencies or the domination of  nance capital. Instead, interlocking
directorates and the connections that emerge are more indicative of the
desire among top corporate oYcials to obtain an overview of “con-
temporary business practices and the general business environment.”
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(1984:85) Furthermore, these individuals who generate such an overview
“are expected . . . to take a far more active role in promoting their pol-
itics.” (1984:61) Therefore, in addition to contributing to the cohesion
of the capitalist class, the operation of the “inner circle” has both infor-
mational and explicitly political ends.7
Three of the  ve models Scott identi es reside at the organizational
or inter-organizational level of analysis. The  nance capital model argues
that  nancial and industrial capital will become integrated into “money
capital.” (Scott, 1985:6) Most identi ed with Hilferding’s Finance Capital,
this perspective emphasizes the extensive set of corporate connections
between banks and insurance companies, on the one hand, and indus-
trial corporations on the other. The  nance capital perspective predicts
distinct spheres of in uence that combine both forms of economic cap-
ital through the ties formed by individual interlocking directorates. For
example, in their study of the corporate relations of 47  nance capi-
talists, Soref and Zeitlin (1987:77) conclude that “Capital, . . . and the
 nance capitalist, representing and personifying the coalescence of  nancial
and industrial capital, exercise the decisive power in the nation’s top
industrial corporations.” While the units of observation may be indi-
vidual capitalists, the focus of their research is on the connections between
 nancial and industrial corporations. This formation of spheres of in u-
ence diVers from the other two interorganizational models in so far as
the relation is not characterized by either competition or cooperation.
Scott’s second and third models of corporate interlocks emerged in
the 1970s and 1980s when the central question was not whether the
phenomenon of interlocking directorates represented an important ingre-
dient to the economic and political power of the corporate elite. Rather,
the debate focused on the speci c ways in which interlocking direc-
torates operated and the potential bene ts oVered to corporations. Under
Scott’s heading of co-ordination and control, and in particular, bank
control, early studies on interlocking directorates viewed ties between
corporations as an inter-organizational means by which to monitor
and/or control the behavior of other corporations. PfeVer (1972) pre-
dicted that  rms with high debt-equity ratios were more likely to have
“outside” (i.e., bank) directors. Allen’s research (1974:404) revealed an
“integrated structure of elite co-optation among major corporations in
which  nancial institutions increasingly occupy the central positions.”
Kotz (1978) reported that nearly forty percent of his sample was under
“ nancial control”. In their series of stochastic models for the intercor-
porate networks of 26  rms in Minnesota, Galaskiewicz and Wasserman
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(1981) found increasing linkages between non nancial and  nancial cor-
porations between 1969 and 1978. Most recently Stearns and Mizruchi
(1993) found that board representation by  nancial institutions is posi-
tively associated to the levels of short-term debt, long term-public debt,
and long-term private borrowing.
Establishing the so-called resource dependence perspective, JeVrey
PfeVer (1987) has forcefully argued that corporate interlocks serve to
reduce organizational (i.e., corporate) uncertainty. In examining the com-
position of electric utility boards, PfeVer (1974) found that board mem-
bership from manufacturing interests was positively related to both the
proportion of total employment coming from manufacturing, and the
level of electric sales to industrial customers. Earlier, PfeVer demon-
strated in his study of 80 randomly selected corporations that levels of
representation by attorneys were positively associated with levels of
national regulation experienced by the corporation (1972). Recent organ-
izational research into interlocking directorates has explicitly examined
the implications of these co-operative ties. Haunschild and Beckman
(1998) found that centrally interlocked corporations depend less on alter-
nate sources for obtaining information concerning acquisitions. In an
earlier study, Haunschild (1993) argued that corporate interlocks serve
as a medium through which directors learn acquisition strategies. There-
fore, corporate interlocks have been linked to a wide array of bene ts to
 rms. Whether a vehicle for collusion, cooptation, monitoring, control,
or learning, Mizruchi concludes that “interlock networks matter, and
that they in uence the behavior of  rms.” (1996:289) 8
At the structural level of analysis, three studies emerged in the 1980s
that were both ground breaking in their approach and scope. Mizruchi
(1982) and Scott and GriV (1984) conducted longitudinal studies encom-
passing the period between 1904 to the middle of the 1970s. While
Mark Mizruchi reanalyzed David Bunting’s data for roughly 150 cor-
porations in seven time periods in the United States, John Scott and
Catherine GriV looked at patterns of interlocking among a larger num-
ber of  rms at three time periods in Great Britain. Both studies shared
the distinction of utilizing network analyses in the understanding of
changes within the intercorporate network of ties. Mizruchi found that
although  nancial corporations, and in particular investment banks
became less central in the network prior to the depression,  nancial
corporations by 1974 had come to occupy a more general role in the
network due to their central positions, rather than the exercise of power
over speci c non nancial corporations. Similarly, Scott and GriV found
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that intercorporate relations were less a matter of personal power, but
rather a function of the “institutional power [i.e., structural positions]
of the enterprises with which they were associated.”
A similar conclusion is drawn by Mintz and Schwartz (1985) in their
work examining power relations that  ow through the interlocking boards
of 1,131 corporations in 1962. Wishing to understand how interlocking
directorates operate, and why  nancial institutions consistently appear
in the center of intercorporate relations, they begin by conceptualizing
the totality of these relations as the source of both discretionary deci-
sions and structural constraint. In short, the very interdependencies of
the corporate world produce a structural hegemony in which power is
not a matter of one company calling all the shots. “The primary source
of this hegemony is control over the direction of capital  ows, not direct
intervention.” (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985:249) Consequently, interlock-
ing directorates are not merely the manifestation of  nance capital exert-
ing “outside” control and usurping the powers of decision making within
dependent corporations. Rather, Mintz and Schwartz conclude that
“interlocking directorates are . . . a method of managing discretion.”
(1985:250) Therefore, the appropriate level of analysis would be the
structure of the network itself—its level of concentration, and the degree
of connectivity within the set of corporate interlocks.
Given these various theoretical perspectives, we believe our data 
to be particularly suited for describing the changes in corporate inter-
locking at both the structural and corporate levels of analyses over the
second half of the Twentieth Century. Increasing levels of corporate
concentration among our U.S.  rms, particularly among  nancial cor-
porations will lend empirical support to the  nance capital model.
Alternatively, increasing corporate connectivity among non nancial cor-
porations would be consistent with a resource dependence interpretation.
However, we cannot assume that the trend among our U.S. corpora-
tions will invariantly be one of increasing network concentration. Placed
within the context of increasing globalization and the changing regula-
tory environment, it may very well be the case that the pattern of cor-
porate interlocking reveals itself to be quite variable. For cutting across
a trend toward increased concentration would be the forces of global-
ization and a changing regulatory context domestically. The interna-
tionalization of capital may reduce domestic interlocking as  rms divert
social capital from maintaining old ties to forging new ties abroad.
Alternatively, Fligstein and Freeland (1995) have argued that patterns
of corporate governance are more in uenced by their national envi-
ronments than the dynamic of globalization. Therefore, changes in pat-
198 roy c. barnes and emily r. ritter
terns of corporate interlocking would be re ective of such changes. While
we do not formally test hypotheses concerning corporate interlocking
over time, the literature certainly suggests a number of possible inter-
pretations for the descriptive results below.
Methodology
This study analyzes the trends in network characteristics at four time
periods. Wishing to assemble an array of corporations that capture both
the top corporations in the U.S. economy and the leading corporations
by industry type, we  rst incorporated the top four corporations by rev-
enues within the various industry surveys published by Standard and
Poor’s. We also included into our study any corporation that was in
the top 100 of the Fortune 500 in terms of revenues. Finally, given the
importance of  nancial institutions within our economy, we also built
into our population of corporations the top 20 commercial banks, and
the top 15 insurance companies by assets. This procedure resulted in
approximately 250 corporations for each time period. Table 1 presents
the number of corporations after classifying them into  ve broad cate-
gories— nancial, “top” industrial (the upper 25th percentile of corpo-
rations in terms of revenues for each time period), industrial, utility,
and transportation.
Table 1: Type of Corporation by Year
Time Period
1962 1973 1983 1995
N Percent N Percent N Percent N Percent
Financial 42 16.2 41 15.4 42 15.6 46 18.0
Top Industrial 48 18.5 51 19.2 51 18.9 45 17.6
Industrial 143 55.0 148 55.6 152 56.3 134 52.5
Utility 14 5.4 14 5.3 13 4.8 14 5.5
Transportation 13 5.0 12 4.5 12 4.4 16 6.3
TOTAL 260 100.1 266 100.0 270 100.0 255 99.9
To be clear, these “populations” do not necessarily represent the
same companies, and are not random samples. There is certainly sub-
stantial overlap between any two consecutive time periods. However,
given our desire to include the top four corporations in the various
Standard and Poor’s Industry Surveys, the array of corporations in 1995
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is quite diVerent than that of 1962. Therefore, this study is essentially
a trend study with four cross-sections. Why not pursue a panel study
design? Given the number of corporations in our study, their repre-
sentation across wide-ranging and variable industries, and the turbulent
nature of corporate mergers and acquisitions, a trend study is prefer-
able to a panel study.9 Consider the contrasting fates of two industries
between 1962 and 1995. In 1962, lead and lead smelting was not an
insigni cant industry—revenues among the top four companies topped
300 million dollars. However, the number of corporations listed by
Standard and Poor’s under the heading of lead mining and smelting
decreased in 1973 and again in 1983. By 1995, Standard and Poor’s
no longer provided data on the lead industry. In contrast, the 1962
Standard and Poor’s industry survey of electronic corporations had no
listing for computer software. By 1995, the S&P industry survey listed
Unisys, Microsoft, Computer Sciences, and Oracle as the top four soft-
ware companies in terms of revenues. Clearly what now could be con-
sidered “household” names did not exist some thirty-three years earlier.
A further disadvantage of a panel study for the examination of the net-
work of corporate ties over time is that by restricting oneself to the
same companies, the design would “build-in” stability.
Once we had identi ed the corporations to be included in our study,
the second phase simply involved recording the names of all the direc-
tors for these corporations. The primary data sources here were the
various Moody’s Manuals. In a few cases, we utilized the Standard &
Poor’s Register of Directors and Executives, or used the EDGAR on-line data
base for 1995 available through the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion’s website. This yielded 4,018 names in 1962, 4,046 in 1973, 4,078
in 1983, and 3,209 in 1995.
The third phase in this research project involved the construction of
a series of sociomatrices for each year of this longitudinal study. A
sociomatrix is a symmetric matrix in which each column represents a
corporation and each row corresponds to the same array of corpora-
tions. The combination of a given row and column therefore is equiv-
alent to the interlocking of corporations through common board
membership. For example, if corporation 172 interlocked with corpo-
ration 235, then the sociomatrix would record a link in Row 172,
Column 235, and in Row 235, Column 172. For each of the four time
periods, we  rst generated a set of overlaps based on those directors
who sat on only two boards of directors—or those directors involved
in “single interlocks”. The second sociomatrix for each time period con-
sisted of all the ties formed by the directors who sat on three or more
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boards of directors—i.e., directors involved in “multiple interlocks.”10
Table 2 reports the number of directors who did not form an inter-
locking directorship, and the number of board members involved in sin-
gle and multiple interlocks. Once these sociomatrices were read into
UCINET V for Windows,11 it was very simple to “add” the matrix of
Single Interlocks to the matrix of Multiple Interlocks for each of the
four data years.
Table 2: Single and Multiple Interlocks Among All Directorships, 
1962–1995
Time Period
1962 1973 1983 1995
N % N % N %t N %
Directorships 
not part of an Inter-
locking Directorate 2,563 63.8 2,694 66.6 2,578 63.1 2,100 65.4
Directorships in Single
Interlocking Directorates 708 17.6 696 17.2 742 18.2 588 18.3
Directorships in Multiple
Interlocking Directorates 747 18.6 656 16.2 767 18.8 521 16.2
TOTAL 4,018 100.0 4,046 100.0 4,087 100.0 3,209 99.9
Two nal notes with respect to the construction of our various socioma-
tricies. For the majority of our analyses, the dimensions of the socioma-
tricies were smaller than the number of corporations in Table 1. This
reduction in size is due to the fact that for our analysis of network cen-
trality and corporate clique formation, we excluded any corporation that
was not linked to any other corporation. The exclusion of so-called “iso-
lates” reduced the number of corporations by 21, 35, 34, and 29 cor-
porations for the years 1962, 1973, 1983, and 1995 respectively. These
exclusions represent between 8.1 and 13.2 percent of the companies
from the original set of selected corporations. Second, in constructing
the sociomatrices for the four time periods in this project, we originally
recorded the actual number of ties between any given pair of corpo-
rations based on the data reported in Table 2. However, to allow for
the comparison between diVerent forms of network centrality, we used
only dichotomized data that essentially record the incidence (presence
or absence) of a link between diVerent corporations.
At this point, an example would be helpful. To illustrate several of
the methodological points mentioned above, we have constructed a graph
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of all ties between 25 select corporations for the year 1995 (Figure 1).
Notice  rst Coastal Corp. in the upper right portion of Figure 1. As
can be seen here, the Coastal corporation is not tied to any other cor-
poration in this mini-network and therefore would be excluded when
calculating network centrality measures and the formation of subgroups
of corporations. As to our de nition of “single” and “multiple” inter-
locks, notice the tie between the Brown Group and ITT Industries
formed by Gen. Edward C. Meyer. Since Gen. Meyer only served as
a director for these two corporations, he formed a “single” interlocking
directorate, or one corporate tie. In contrast, Robert E. Allen was listed
as a board member of four diVerent corporations—AT&T Corp., Bristol
Meyers Squib, Chrysler Corp., and Pepsico. This individual generated
six diVerent ties among these four corporations. In other words, Mr.
Allen represents a “multiple” interlocking directorate.
The single lines in Figure 1 illustrate a  nal methodological point,
namely that the sociomatricies in our analyses record only the presence
or absence of a link between two given corporations and ignores the
“multiciplicity” of corporate ties. For example, McDonald Douglas and
Ralston Purina had three ties due to their interlocking directorates, and
Pepsico and Nations bank shared two diVerent directors. While the pres-
ence of multiple ties between any given pair of corporations is inter-
esting, only 7 out of a possible 276 pairs of the 24 linked corporations
demonstrated such multiple links. For our analyses below, we are pri-
marily concerned with the network of corporate ties and bracket the
issue of the strength of ties between any given pair of corporations.
The Structure of Corporate Networks
For each of the four time periods, our analyses looked at three diVerent
facets of network structure: Network Density, Network Centrality, and
the Number of subgroups or cliques. In essence, the analyses address
the proportion of possible ties, the relative equality among corporations
with respect to their “importance” to the network as a whole, and the
potential number of complete subgroups in the network.
Network Density
Perhaps the most straight forward indicator of a network’s connect-
edness is its density—or the proportion of actual links to the total pos-
sible number of links between pairs of corporations. Consider the number
of lines in Figure 1. There are 50 unique links between these 25 cor-
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porations. These connections would yield a network density of 0.1667;
or 50 over a possible 300 links. Alternatively, we can calculate the net-
work density after omitting the corporate isolate, the Coastal Corporation:
the same 50 existing ties divided by 276 possible ties, or a network den-
sity of 0.1812. When dealing with sociomatricies as large as ours, there
are literally tens of thousands of connections between all possible pairs.
For each of the four time periods, Table 3 reports the number of ties
between all of the corporations, the number of possible links (both with
and without isolates), and the network density (again calculated with
and without isolates). To be clear, the number of links represents the
number of pairs of corporations tied through an interlocking directorate.
Since we just recorded the presence or absence of a link, the data in
Table 3 will not correspond exactly to the data in Table 2 that includes
multiple ties between pairs of corporations.
While one certainly would expect lower levels of network density
when calculated with isolates, Table 3 demonstrates that when isolates
are included, their presence tends to intensify the changes observed
across time periods. Between 1962 and 1973, as well as the trend
between 1983 and 1995, the relative declines in network density are
sharper with isolates than without. However, the period between 1973
and 1983 exhibits essentially the same increase in density whether we
include or exclude corporations not tied to other corporations in the
network. In fact, due to the lower decrease in network density when
we excluded corporate isolates, the increase between 1973 and 1983
exceeds the density observed in 1962. Certainly there was a reversal in
the trend of decreasing density within the network without isolates.
However, the increase did not surpass the initial proportion of possible 
Table 3: Network Density by Single, Multiple, and Total Ties, 1962–1995 
Time Period
1962 1973 1983 1995
Number of Corporate Interlocks 1,109 1,002 1,180 840
Network Properties Including 
Corporate “Isolates”
Number of Corporations 260 266 270 255
Number of Possible Ties” 33,670 35,245 36,315 32,385
Network Density 0.0329 0.0284 0.0325 0.0259
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Table 3 (cont.)
Time Period
1962 1973 1983 1995
Network Properties Excluding 
Corporate “Isolates”
Number of Corporations 239 229 235 226
Number of Possible Ties” 28,441 26,106 27,495 25,425
Network Density 0.0390 0.0384 0.0429 0.0330
ties in 1962. In short, by excluding corporate isolates, the changes across
time tend to be softened, but certainly not altered. The overall trend
in network density both with and without isolates are quite similar.
Our methodology also allows us to disaggregate the total number of
ties into those formed by single and multiple interlocking directorates.
Table 4 presents the total number of corporations (excluding isolates)
and the total number of possible ties. The middle panel of Table 4
reports the ties attributed to single and multiple interlocking directorates.
Finally, the bottom section of the table presents the network density on
the basis of only single interlocks, only multiple interlocks, and the com-
bined set of corporate ties. Focusing attention on the bottom portion
of Table 4, the data for links generated by single interlocks appears
fairly stable across the four time periods. However, although the net-
work density for only multiple interlocking directorates hovers around
.03 for the  rst three time periods, the data for 1995 exhibits a size-
able decline. Given the relative importance of multiple interlocking direc-
torates in generating links between corporations, it is understandable
that the density for the network from both single and multiple inter-
locks will closely mirror the trend for density from multiple interlocks
alone. However, when we take into consideration the ties formed by
single interlocks in this last time period, the overall network density does
not fall below 3.3 percent. In short, the data indicate that both single
and multiple interlocking directorates are important and that together,
despite a trend toward decreasing network density, the level of corporate
connectivity across these four time periods remains above 3 percent.
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Table 4: Network Density by Single, Multiple, and Total Ties, 1962–1995
Time Period
1962 1973 1983 1995
Network Properties Excluding 
Isolates
Number of Corporations 239 229 235 226
Number of Possible Ties 28,441 26,106 27,495 25,425
Number of Interlocks
Formed by Single Ties 318 326 349 278
Formed by Multiple Ties 868 741 888 598
Formed by Total Ties1 1,109 1,002 1,180 840
Network Density
Due to Single Ties 0.0112 0.0125 0.0127 0.0109
Due to Multiple Ties 0.0305 0.0284 0.0323 0.0235
Due to Total Ties1 0.0390 0.0384 0.0429 0.0330
1 Totals will not equal the sum of the binary ties from single and multiple interlocks
since a proportion of the ties become redundant when the two sociomatricies are added.
Network Centrality
In this section, we examine three measures of network centrality over
time. Taken at the corporate level of analysis (as opposed to the entire
network of corporate interlocking), measures of centrality operationalize
the importance of a given corporation in the network. On the other
hand, measures of network centrality serve as indicators of the varia-
tion among the corporations with respect to their corporate centralities.
For example, return to Figure 1. Here it is fairly clear that Pepsico is
a prominent corporation within the network of 24 interlocked corpo-
rations. In contrast, Shaw Industries in the bottom right is relatively un-
important in this mini network. This variability in network importance
will be captured by the overall network centrality measures. A more
extreme example would be to focus on Pepsico and its direct links to
13 other corporations. In this example of maximum variability, Pepsico
would clearly be the most important, while the other corporations are
equally unimportant (ignoring their ties to other corporations). In short, to
gain an understanding of the various measures of network centrality,
one must move between the corporate and network levels of analyses.
For these descriptive analyses of network centralization, we use three
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of Freeman’s de nitions of network centrality (1977, 1979)—degree cen-
trality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality.12 At the corpo-
rate level of analysis, degree centrality is the most straight-forward
measure and is simply based on the total number of direct ties between
a given corporation and all others. Recalling again Figure 1, it is 
fairly obvious that in this micro network of 24 corporations, Pepsico is
more central than say TIAA or McDonald Douglas. The measure of
network centralization, or the variability among corporations with respect
to their degree centrality is the sum of the diVerences between the max-
imum corporate degree centrality score and each individual corpora-
tion’s degree centrality score, all divided by the possible number of ties
with other corporations.
The second measure of network importance or centrality is closeness
centrality. At the corporate level of analysis, closeness centrality is based
on the notion that important corporations in a network are able to
quickly communicate with all other corporations. This alternative view
sees “important” corporations in a network as having ‘minimum steps’
when relating to all other corporations. Conversely, a corporation that
needs to go through many other corporations would not be viewed as
very “important” in a network of all corporations. At the level of each
individual corporation, closeness centrality is measured by  rst taking
the inverse of the sum of shortest distances between a given corpora-
tion and all others. Then, one multiplies this value by the total num-
ber of corporations minus 1, all multiplied by 100. In calculating closeness
centrality, it is important to note that one initially sums the shortest dis-
tances between a particular corporation and all others. For example, take
two possible paths between the Brown Group and Pepsico in Figure 1.
One passes through McDonald Douglas (two steps), while the other
must travel through ITT Industries and Dayton Hudson for a total of
three steps. Again, the formal measurement of corporate centrality cor-
responds closely with one’s intuitive sense of the concept, since Pepsico
(the corporation with the highest closeness centrality score) would have
far fewer steps to reach all the other corporations than would TIAA in
Figure 1. To measure network centrality based on corporate “close-
ness”, one again needs to develop a measure of variability. For network
closeness centrality, we sum the diVerences between the most central
and each individual corporation, and then divide by the maximum pos-
sible distances between all the possible pairs of corporations.
Finally, one can create a measure of corporate importance that con-
ceptualizes centrality as an indicator of how important a particular cor-
poration is in linking a given pair of corporations. In other words, a
corporation is central if it is a conduit between as many possible pairs
of corporations in a network as possible. This third form of network
centrality is referred to as betweenness centrality and is essentially the
proportion of paths between all possible pairs of corporations involving
and not involving the corporation of interest. More formally, between-
ness centrality represents the total number of paths between a pair of
corporations involving a given corporation divided by the total number
of paths between this pair of corporations (not including the corpora-
tion in question). The measure of network centralization based on cor-
porate “betweenness” is simply the sum of the diVerences between the
most central and each individual corporation, divided by the number
of corporations in the network minus 1. Again, a relatively high value
for network betweenness centrality would indicate that there are rela-
tively few, but very important corporations in the network serving as
key linkages.
One  nal note as to these measures of corporate and network cen-
trality. It is important to appreciate that both closeness and between-
ness centrality incorporate indirect interlocking between potential
competitors. Theoretically, this nuance is critical in understanding the
potential impact of interlocking directorates. As noted by many schol-
ars, while direct links have been forbidden under the Clayton Anti-
Trust Act of 1914, indirect interlocks between competitors are exempt
from this prohibition.
In Table 5 below, we present the descriptive statistics for three mea-
sures of network centrality at our four points in time. While our dis-
cussion focuses on the three network centrality measures described above
(shaded lines in Table 5), we follow Wasserman and Faust’s suggestion
(1994:182) and report the mean level of centrality and the variance of
centrality scores across the corporations comprising the network.
Let us  rst consider degree centrality—the measure of network cen-
tralization based on the number of direct ties a corporation has to all
other corporations in a network. The mean corporate degree central-
ity, the  rst line of Table 5, shows a fairly steady extent of interlock-
ing between the years of 1962 and 1983—roughly 9 links per corporation;
however by 1995, the average number of direct ties had fallen to 7.4.
More importantly, both the corporate degree variance measure and the
network degree centrality measure indicate that the network of corpo-
rate ties had become noticeably less concentrated in the last time period.
In other words, the overall level of corporate concentration with respect
to direct ties appears to have decreased between 1962 and 1995, most
dramatically between 1983 and 1995.
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Table 5: Measures of Network Centrality, 1962–1995 
Year
1962 1973 1983 1995
Centrality Measure
Mean Corporate Degree 9.280 8.742 10.043 7.434
Corporate Degree Variance 51.055 43.536 55.045 28.936
Network Degree Centrality 14.29 15.16 13.77 8.33
N of Corporations 239 229 235 226
Mean Corporate Closeness 35.874 35.486 35.804 32.131
Corporate Closeness Variance 21.761 22.438 27.093 24.396
Network Closeness Centrality 23.41 26.64 22.89 22.93
N of Corporations 239 229 235 226
Mean Corporate Betweenness 218.586 213.493 217.647 246.916
Corporate Betweenness Variance 110761 106079 69270 80419
Network Betweenness Centrality 8.13 9.14 5.19 5.73
N of Corporations 239 229 235 226
Turning next to closeness centrality, recall that a prominent corpo-
ration is one that is located near as many corporations as possible in
the network. In contrast to the story told regarding degree centrality,
the middle panel of Table 5 suggests a constant level of overall corpo-
rate closeness. The average closeness centrality score across all corpo-
rations over the four time periods ranges between 36 and 32. Similarly,
the variance across corporations also moves within a fairly tight band
between 21 and 27. Finally, the network measure of closeness also shows
a fairly consistent level of closeness centrality with the relatively minor
exception of 1973. In short, corporations maintained their overall lev-
els of closeness to each other over the period between 1962 and 1995.
Turning lastly to the measures of betweenness centrality, we see
increasing divergence between the numbers across time. At the corpo-
rate level, there is a noticeable increase in the mean betweenness score
across corporations. This suggests that on average, corporations in-
creased in their importance in terms of serving as conduits between
other corporations. Although the bottom portion of Table 5 reports an
overall increase in corporate betweenness from 1983 to 1995, it is also
the case that the amount of variance between corporate betweenness
decreases from 1973 to 1983. This means that corporations were becom-
ing more similar with respect to their intermediary roles. Finally, the
overall level of corporate network betweenness also demonstrates that
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between 1962 and 1995, corporations were becoming more similar with
respect to betweenness centrality.
To summarize, focus, and conclude this section on network central-
ity, let us compare the trajectories of the three measures of network
centrality over time. Perhaps the most striking feature of Table 5 is the
decrease in network degree centrality (i.e., corporations are becoming
more similar with respect to the number of direct interlocks between
corporations), and the similar pattern of change for both closeness and
betweenness centrality. From 1962 to 1973, there was a slight increase
in the importance of some corporations with respect to being close to
and between other corporations. The ten years between 1973 and 1983
exhibit a noticeable decrease in these two network centrality measures
while the last segment demonstrates relative stability. In other words,
corporations have become more similar to each other with respect to
closeness and betweenness, especially for the period from 1973 to 1983.
Given the structural signi cance of indirect interlocks, it is important to
note that the two measures of network centrality that tap secondary
connections also demonstrate a similar pattern of change over time.
Taken together, these  ndings on network centrality suggest that the
patterns of corporate interlocking are becoming less concentrated, while
on the other hand, the corporations that comprise these networks are
becoming more similar in terms of connecting the network as a whole.
From 1962 to 1995, corporations maintain a fairly tight knit set of con-
nections; but by the latter time period, these corporate ties are distrib-
uted more evenly and appear to be less dominated by fewer heavily
interlocked corporations.
Before we present our  ndings on corporate clique formation, let us
shift our level of analysis away from the network as a whole and focus
brie y on diVerences between corporations. Given the variable trends
in network centrality, do the corporations in our study experience 
similar or disparate trends in their levels of corporate centrality? Turning
 rst to degree centrality, Table 6 presents the average corporate degree
centrality by type of corporation— nancial, top industrial, industrial,
utility, and transportation. Between 1962 and 1995, the most dramatic
decline in average centrality is found in the  nancial corporations. In
fact, this decline is even more pronounced than the decline in overall
network centrality. Transportation corporations also demonstrate a decline
in their average degree centrality between 1962 and 1995. In contrast,
both industrial and top industrial corporations post fairly stable levels
of degree centrality, if not actual increases.
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Considering brie y the average closeness centrality scores by type of
corporation, Table 6 indicates relatively homogeneous results. Between
1962 and 1983, the average level of closeness centrality remained fairly
constant. However, between 1983 and 1995, all corporations, regard-
less of their classi cation, exhibited a sizeable drop in average corpo-
rate closeness centrality. Again, the data in Table 6 indicate that the
drop in the average corporate closeness centrality was greatest among
the 41  nancial corporations. We also note that among the transportation
corporations, there is a steady decrease in this form of corporate cen-
trality. Between 1962 and 1995, transportation companies would increas-
ingly have to make a greater number of steps when wishing to contact
other corporations in the network.
Table 6: 
Mean Corporate Centrality Scores by Year and Type of Corporation 
Mean Corporate Degree 
Centrality Year
Corporation Type 1962 1973 1983 1995
Financial 15.195 14.895 14.184 8.048
Top Industrial 11.000 10.500 12.560 11.000
Industrial 6.477 6.000 7.770 5.791
Utility 11.714 10.000 9.923 8.286
Transportation 10.500 8.600 9.667 6.563
Mean Corporate Closeness   
Centrality                                              Year
Corporation Type 1962 1973 1983 1995
Financial 38.613 38.329 37.654 32.597
Top Industrial 37.606 37.729 37.807 35.544
Industrial 34.160 33.607 34.553 30.511
Utility 37.591 35.881 35.835 33.254
Transportation 36.890 36.177 34.280 31.677
Mean Corporate Betweenness 
Centrality Year
Corporation Type 1962 1973 1983 1995
Financial 528.054 541.157 398.955 282.792
Top Industrial 225.846 238.058 242.790 410.054
Industrial 106.076 101.299 138.492 169.200
Utility 273.615 208.147 254.220 288.487
Transportation 303.403 214.434 303.855 202.035
212 roy c. barnes and emily r. ritter
Finally, consider the change in betweenness centrality by type of cor-
poration for the years 1962 through 1995. Again, the relative decline
in average levels of betweenness centrality is most evident among  nancial
corporations. However, top industrial, industrial, and utility corporations
show increases in average levels of betweenness centrality, especially
between 1983 and 1995. In fact, top industrial corporations are clearly
the most important in the network in terms of betweenness centrality
by the last year of this study.
These results at the corporate level of analysis demonstrate that much
of the decline in network centralization is due to the considerable
decreases in the centralization of  nancial corporations. While the chang-
ing role of banks and insurance corporations in the network have direct
eVect on degree centralization, they appear to have the strongest eVect
on closeness centrality, and the least impact on betweenness centrality.
Had we focused exclusively on the network level, we would have failed
to detect important variation between corporations. These  ndings sug-
gest that between 1962 and 1995,  nancial and top industrial corpo-
rations have partially exchanged roles within their networks.
Clique Analyses
The  nal set of analyses of our networks of corporate interlocks
involves identifying the number of cohesive subgroups or “cliques.” A
clique is formally de ned as a “maximal complete subgraph of three or
more [corporations].” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994:254). Put plainly,
what this means is that a clique is formed if three or more corpora-
tions have ties to every other corporation in that clique. Consider the
set of ties linking TIAA, Fleet Financial and Bausch & Lomb on the
right side of Figure 1. These three ties meet the criteria for a clique of
size 3. Each of these three corporations in this subgroup are directly
linked to the two other corporations. Now, examine the set of ties
formed by Robert Allen between AT&T, Bristol Meyers Squib, Chrysler
Corp. and Pepsico. As in the  rst example, every corporation is directly
tied to all others in this subgroup. AT&T is tied to Bristol Meyers
Squib, Chrysler, and Pepsico; Bristol Meyers Squib is directly tied to
AT&T, Chrysler, and Pepsico; Chrysler Corp. is tied to AT&T, Bristol
Meyers Squib, and Pepsico; and  nally, Pepsico is tied to AT&T, Bristol
Meyers Squib, and Chrysler. This tightly knit subgroup is an example
of a clique with a size of four. It is clear from these two examples that
it becomes extremely diYcult to form cliques as the minimum size
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increases due to the fact that every tie must be present and there are
many more possible ties as the clique size increases. The second exam-
ple also highlights a direct implication of applying clique analyses to
the study of interlocking directorates. Namely, clique formation will mir-
ror the individual subgroups formed by multiple interlocks since each
multiple interlocking directorate will by de nition, form a clique. But
when one analyses the entire set of connections formed by multiple
interlocks, as well as incorporating the ties formed by single interlocks,
additional subgroups are sure to emerge.
Table 7 lists the number and percent of each clique size by year.
To underscore the strict criteria of forming a clique, Table 7 also notes
the number of requisite ties needed to form a clique of a given size.
Before we focus on the number of cliques across time, it is important
to appreciate the total number of cohesive subgroups in all four time
periods. In 1962, we identi ed 413 cliques. Although the number
decreased to 363 by 1973, the number of corporate cliques grew to 502
by 1983. Finally, although the number of subgroups is lowest in 1995,
there are still nearly 300 subgroups. In other words, while we will note
the variation in the number of cliques below, it is important not to
loose sight of the general fact that all of these networks of corporate
ties exhibit a high level of subgroup cohesiveness.
Considering next the change in the number of cliques formed between
1962 and 1995, let us begin with the smallest clique of size 3. While
the number of cohesive subgroups size 3 changes over time, it is inter-
esting to note that for the years 1962 through 1983, the percentage of
cliques sized 3 remained fairly steady. It is only in 1995 that we see a
sharp decrease in the number of three member cliques. Furthermore,
despite this lower number of cliques, it is also the case that there was
an increase in the proportion of cliques with three members when com-
pared to all cliques. This pattern of a comparable number of cliques
between 1962 and 1973, followed by a large increase by 1983, and a
subsequent decline by 1995 is also evident in the number of cliques
consisting of four corporations.
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Table 7: Corporate Clique Formation, 1962–1995
Clique Requsite     1962          1973        1983          1995
Size Ties N % N % N % N %
3 3 261 62.2 236 65.0 329 65.5 215 75.7
4 6 120 29.1 113 31.1 146 29.1 59 20.8
5 10 25 6.1 13 3.6 22 4.4 7 2.5
6 15 5 1.2 1 0.3 4 0.8 2 0.7
7 21 2 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.4
8 28 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
9 36 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.2 0 0.0
10 45 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
Totals 413 100.1 363 100.0 502 100.0 284 100.1
Finally, let us conclude our discussion of clique formation with a
focus on large subgroups, those consisting of 5 or more corporations.
In considering the number of cliques formed size 5 or greater, Table
7 exhibits several dramatic changes over time. In the  rst time period,
there were 32 cohesive subgroups of 5 or more corporations— ve of
which consisted of 6 members. In 1973, there were far fewer large
cliques, 13 subgroups of size 5 and only 1 group consisting of 6 corpo-
rations. 1983 demonstrates a rebound with respect to the number of
large subgroups. There were 22 complete subgroups of 5 corporations
in 1983, as well and 4 sets of 6 corporations. Also noteworthy is the
presence of a clique with 9 members. This clique was formed by Juanita
M. Kreps, the former Secretary of Commerce within the Carter Admin-
istration. Lastly, Table 7 clearly underscores the relative absence of
cliques size 5 or greater in 1995. Taken as a whole, there appears to
be an overall decrease in the number of cohesive subgroups between
1983 and 1995. Furthermore, the percentage of cliques with the mini-
mum size of three grew between 1983 and 1995. In other words, the
network of corporate ties appears to be comprised of fewer and smaller
subgroups.
Conclusions
From our descriptive results, we conclude there has been a general
decrease in network centralization between 1962 and 1995 among our
250 corporations. Over this thirty-three year time period, measures of
network density, centralization, and the number of cliques all under-
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score that by 1995, the pattern of corporate ties was one of decreasing
concentration. While there appears to be greater variability both across
time and between measures for the years 1962, 1973, and 1983, our
data clearly indicate that the network of corporate ties in 1995 was less
dense, less concentrated, and contained few subgroups.
One possible explanation of the relative decline in overall corporate
interlocking is that in this age of mega-mergers, interlocks have become
less important as a vehicle for cooptation, control, or collusion. With
speci c reference to the last year of our study, The Wall Street Journal
reported  ve notable mergers/acquisitions. In July of 1995, Westinghouse
Electric Company made public its plans to purchase CBS Inc. for $5.4
billion. On August 1st, the Walt Disney Co. announced plans to acquire
Capital Cities/ABC Inc. for $19 billion in cash and stock (at that time,
the second largest merger in the history of the U.S.). By the End of
August, Chemical Banking Corp. and Chase Manhattan Corp. announced
that they were merging in a $10 billion deal to create the fourth largest
capitalized bank in the world with nearly $300 billion in assets. Finally,
on October 19th, 1995, Wells Fargo initiated its hostile takeover of First
Interstate Bank Corp. in a $10.84 billion dollar bid to create the eighth
largest bank in the United States. However, while such mergers and
acquisitions have undoubtedly aVected the network of corporate ties—
there is no longer a need to maintain an interlocking directorate between
Westinghouse Electric and CBS or indirect links between Chemical
Banking Corp. and Chase Manhattan—our analysis of corporate cen-
trality suggest that changes in network structure may be due to changes
among  nancial corporations. Recall as well Davis and Mizruchi’s 1999
study that demonstrated a link between decreasing centrality among
 nancial corporations and the general changes within the  nancial sec-
tor in the United States since the 1980s.
It is also plausible that the increasing globalization of capital is hav-
ing a profound eVect on the structure of interlocking directorates in a
speci c country. It may be the case that any study that focuses on the
patterns and structure of corporate ties for a single country will exhibit
relative declines in terms of network density, centralization, and the
number of cliques. While such potential results would indicate a rela-
tive weakening of corporate ties within a particular country, it is possi-
ble that corporate ties between advanced capitalist economies may exhibit
countervailing trends. Indeed, as noted in our literature review, inter-
national interlocking does occur. Most recently, Carroll and Alexander
(1999) found that while Canada exhibits a high concentration of cor-
porate interlocking in the  nance-capital sector, Australia was less con-
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centrated and displayed more international interlocking. Unfortunately,
we cannot oVer empirical evidence that directly bears on this question.
While the work on the formation of a transnational capitalist class and
the evidence of international interlocking in other countries make this
a reasonable interpretation of the trends we observe, we will need to
reserve this speci c question for further research.
The descriptive results of this paper reinforce the general notion that
interlocking directorates remain an important feature in the study of
advanced capitalism. Our data indicate that despite a decline in net-
work centralization, there is also a fair bit of continuity within the over-
all structure of corporate interlocks between 1962 and 1995. Furthermore,
we have traced the changes in the structure of corporate interlocks to
the precipitous decline in centrality of our  nancial corporations. Given
these results on the structure of corporate networks between 1962 and
1995, as well as the changing positions of banks and insurance com-
panies in the 1995 network, we certainly reject any suggestion that inter-
locking directorates have become unimportant. Rather, these results
indicate that the role and status of interlocking directorates as a mech-
anism of capitalist class cohesion may in fact be experiencing signi cant
transformations in this age of economic concentration, globalization, and
changing regulatory environments. Therefore, we believe that inter-
locking corporate directorates must remain an important component to
a critical understanding of corporate power. As investigations continue
into the Twenty-First century on the meaning and importance of cor-
porate interlocks, research must specifying more clearly the internal polit-
ical economy in which corporations interlock and expand the geo-political
boundaries to make the research transnational in scope. In short, the
reconciliation of our descriptive results and these larger economic trends
may only be a matter of expanding our  eld of vision.
Notes
1. We would like to thank William K. Carroll, and the anonymous reviewers of Critical
Sociology for their helpful comments and criticisms. Support for this research has been
provided by several Research Initiative Partnership grants through the OYce of Research,
University of Michigan-Flint. We also wish to acknowledge the research assistance of
John Wells, Ami Baker, and Steve Ward.
2. Data for Gross Domestic Product in 1962 and 1995 are from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, “National Income and Product Accounts.”
The combined revenues of the 500 largest industrial corporations are from Fortune, July,
1963, and Fortune, April 29, 1996.
3. To be sure, changes in patterns of interlocking directorates are not restricted to
changes in the  nancial sector. For example, JeVery PfeVer (1974:337) demonstrated how
board membership consistently re ected the so-called “demographic characteristics” of
its environment. More recently, Lang and Lockhart (1990) found an increase in direct
and indirect interlocking within the airline industry during the period of airline dereg-
ulation of the 1970s.
4. Among the  fteen corporations reported in Sklair (1998), the average percent of
revenues from non-US sources was 26.3. Hewlett-Packard and Intel reported over half
of their revenue in 1994 was from foreign markets. The percent of pro ts from foreign
investments is even more impressive. The average percent of total pro ts from non-US
sources was 30.8 among the twelve corporations in his study of the California Fortune
Global 500. Particularly noteworthy is that 79 percent of Chevron’s pro ts, 70 percent
of the pro ts for the medical supplies corporation McKesson, and 61 percent of Hewlett-
Packard’s pro ts, all came from non-US sources.
5. DomhoV, G. William (Ed.) The Insurgent Sociologist. Special Double Issue: Power Structure
Research II. Vol. 9, No. 2–3, Fall 1979–Winter 1980. More recently under the editor-
ship of Val Burris, Critical Sociology published a special issue on power structure research
in Summer/Fall of 1989.
6. Corporate ties through sharing board members have a long history in Europe and
North America. For example, David Bunting (1983) presents evidence as to the extent
of corporate interlocks during the Nineteenth Century in the United States. Turning to
the Twentieth Century, William Roy (1983) examined the formation of corporate cliques
that support the perspective that corporate ties were generated through resource depen-
dencies among the railroads, coal companies and  nancial institutions. In Europe, Fohlin
(1999) documents the rise of interlocking directorates in Imperial Germany between 1880
and 1910, and Ottosson (1997) examines the emergence of interlocking directorates in
Sweden from 1903 to 1939.
7. It should also be noted that important work has been conducted on the forma-
tion of a transnational capitalist class. If capital is becoming more globalized, it is rea-
sonable to expect that intra-class relations are becoming increasingly global. To begin,
Kees van der Pijl documents the transition from “imagined communities” such as the
Freemasons to transnational planning groups as the Business Council for Sustainable
Development and the World Economic Forum (1998). In this fascinating historical account,
the changing mechanisms of class formation underscore the extent to which a transna-
tional capitalist class has become truly global. Focusing on networks of interlocking direc-
torates, Fennema (1982) examines patterns of corporate concentration both within and
between advanced capitalist economies. This research, the  rst true study of international
interlocking, demonstrates the imperialistic dimension of the integration of industrial and
 nancial capital. In particular, between 1970 and 1976, the network of approximately
200 corporations across 14 countries demonstrated increasing bank centralization. Finally,
in his examination of the members of the transnational capitalist class—the executives
of transnational corporations, as well as globalizing bureaucrats, politicians, profession-
als, merchants and media—Sklair (2001) has argued that corporations and the capital-
ist class are increasing “global” in their orientation, operation, and that consumption
has acquired an increasingly global character.
8. Recently, Galaskiewicz and Zaheer (1999) generated a typology of interorganiza-
tional relationships that includes equitable exchange (i.e., cooperation), collusion, exploita-
tion, and competition. However, by integrating the individual, organizational, and network
levels of analyses, they note that these relationships are dependent upon the interlock-
ing directors themselves and therefore are not simply a matter of network structure or
organizational strategies.
9. We acknowledge important work on interlocking directorates that has analyzed the
same corporations over time. However, given the inherent problem of attrition in panel
studies, this research is somewhat limited in scope. For example, while Galaskiewicz 
et al. (1985) analyzed the network of 116 corporations, these corporations were restricted
to the Minneapolis-St. Paul area and covered only three consecutive years. In contrast,
Carroll’s (1986) examination of continuity and change within the “inner circle” of the
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largest Canadian corporations over a thirty year time span included only 21 corpora-
tions (given his selection criteria).
10. We acknowledge that this distinction between individual and multiple directors
departs from the established practice of distinguishing so-called “big-linkers” from other
interlocking directors. Originally used by the Dutch researcher Meindert Fennema, the
concept of a “big linker” underscores the structural importance of individuals who sit
on four or more boards of directors. While useful insights have been generated regard-
ing the formation of a European network of corporate interlocks (Fennema, 1982; Fennema
and Schijf, 1985) and the changes within the major enterprise groups in Canada between
1976 and 1986 (Carroll and Lewis, 1991), we have departed from this tradition for two
reasons. First, there is a qualitative diVerence between those directors who sit on only
two boards, and those who sit on three or more in so far as the former not form a
clique of corporations. Secondly, the percentage increase in the number of direct ties
formed is greatest moving from two directorships to three.
11. Borgatti, S.P., M.G. Everett, and L.C. Freeman. 1999. UCINET 5.0 Version 1.00.
Natick: Analytic Technologies.
12. We have made a conscious eVort to present our measures of network centrality
in a non technical fashion. For readers who are interested in knowing the precise for-
mulas or those who desire an in-depth treatment of network analyses, two very good
sources are Wasserman and Faust (1994) and Knoke and Kuklinski (1982).
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